Curing the Infirmities of the Unconscionability Doctrine by Beh, Hazel G.
O - Beh_17 (EGK) (1) (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2015 12:07 AM  
 
[1011] 
Curing the Infirmities of the  
Unconscionability Doctrine 
Hazel Glenn Beh* 
This Article considers the unconscionability doctrine and confronts criticisms that the 
doctrine is fatally flawed as too vague, flexible, and ill-defined. It argues that 
unconscionability is a vital contract doctrine that entrusts common law judges with the 
latitude and discretion to safeguard essential contracting fairness and justice. 
Unconscionability serves as the line of demarcation between hard bargains and unfair 
bargains. This Article explores proposals to fortify and invigorate the unconscionability 
doctrine in order to promote contracting fairness in an era where one-sided, adhesionary 
contracts abound. 
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Introduction 
Chuck Knapp has been a staunch defender of unconscionability as a 
judicial tool to guard against contracting unfairness, particularly in 
contracts of adhesion between unequal parties.1 He and others have 
identified the doctrine’s many useful judicial functions. Knapp has 
observed that unconscionability serves as a signaling device by which 
courts identify instances where lawmakers should take corrective action.2 
Unconscionability also serves as a “safety net,” allowing courts discretion 
to refuse enforcement of contracts that exact unfair terms as a result of 
gross disproportionate economic power on a case-by-case basis.3 
Unconscionability reveals the demarcation line between hard bargaining 
and unfair bargaining, aiding in the development of ethical norms within 
the marketplace and in transactions facilitated by lawyers.4 Beyond party 
 
 1. See generally Charles L. Knapp, Unconscionability in American Contract Law: A Twenty-First-
Century Survey, in Commercial Contract Law: A Transatlantic Perspective 309 (Larry A. DiMatteo 
et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey]; Charles L. Knapp, Blowing the 
Whistle on Mandatory Arbitration: Unconscionability as a Signaling Device, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 609 
(2009) [hereinafter Knapp, Blowing the Whistle].  
 2. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle, supra note 1, at 613–14. 
 3. Id.; see also Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 Ala. L. 
Rev. 73, 74 (2006) (arguing that accepting flexibility within the unconscionability doctrine allows courts to 
protect contracting fairness). 
 4. Paul D. Carrington, Unconscionable Lawyers, 19 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 361, 371–72 (2002) (describing 
how a discussion of ethics and law with a client can promote morally informed business decisions); 
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disputes, unconscionability has revealed itself as a galvanizing5 “judicial 
counterweight” to arbitration laws that favor the economically powerful 
and so might be emblematic of a new common law era.6 
However, for all its promise, the limitations of the unconscionability 
doctrine are widely acknowledged, and these modulate its policing power.7 
First, the hammer of unconscionability rarely changes bargaining behaviors, 
particularly among institutional repeat players.8 Statutory regimes that 
regulate and sanction notorious industries or practices are better suited 
to wipe out industry-wide predatory behavior.9 Arthur Leff, whose early 
writings had a strong influence on the development of the unconscionability 
doctrine, once characterized the doctrine’s capacity to impact mass business 
practices as nothing more than trivial, calling it simply “case-by-case 
sniping.”10 
Second, when unconscionability is raised, it rarely succeeds because 
of countervailing values that favor contract enforcement.11 Contract law’s 
infatuation with formalism, freedom of contract, and the burden of proof 
necessary to prove unconscionability are so formidable that the doctrine 
might be characterized as ineffective.12 
 
Gregory M. Duhl, The Ethics of Contract Drafting, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 989, 1030 (2010) 
(“[C]ontract law . . . should help define the ethical rules for attorneys in the contract-drafting context.”). 
 5. Summarizing lower court decisions to work around the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration 
decisions that diminish the role of the courts in contract disputes, Knapp describes this galvanization:  
By invoking the rhetoric of unconscionability, these judges are not merely acting tactically 
in a game of legal chess—although they may be doing that as well—they are sending a 
message, not just to the U.S. Supreme Court, but to the other officials and institutions that 
collectively make up our legal system. 
Knapp, Blowing the Whistle, supra note 1, at 628. 
 6. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of 
Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. 
Resol. 757, 763–64 (2004). 
 7. E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law during the 1980’s: The Top Ten, 41 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 203, 222–23 (1990) (characterizing unconscionability as a weak doctrine suffering 
“arrested development”). 
 8. See infra notes 15–18 and accompanying text. 
 9. In critiquing unconscionability, Leff pointed out that case-by-case litigation would do little to 
change a business practice. Instead, at best, businesses might alter contracts to get around court 
pronouncements. In an even more vitriolic attack on unconscionability than in The Emperor’s New 
Clause, discussed infra note 13, he wrote, “[w]ouldn’t more be changed by explicit positive law, 
administratively interpreted and enforced, than . . . feed-back from easily distinguishable, easily 
stallable, exceedingly expenses cases?” Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers 
and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349, 357 (1970). 
 10. Id. at 358 (“One does not cure any serious breakdown in a theoretically competitive market 
system by case-to-case sniping, but one doesn’t do much harm either.”).  
 11. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An 
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1067, 1098–99 (2006) (finding empirical 
support for the hypothesis that unconscionability claims seldom succeed). 
 12. See Stempel, supra note 6, at 840–41 (describing the current status of unconscionability as “a 
disfavored stepchild of contract law” that judges should apply “only in the most extreme cases”). 
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Third, even when an unconscionability defense prevails, the 
remedies are meager. Although unconscionability is aimed at ferreting 
out, in Leff’s words, “naughty” bargaining and its “resulting evil,”13 there 
are no attending sanctions that fortify the doctrine. Still worse, although 
the doctrine is aimed at bad behavior wreaking evil consequences, the 
legal profession itself implicitly condones such behavior, stopping short 
of prohibiting the insertion of unconscionable provisions in contracts, 
under the laws governing the legal profession.14 
Judicial timidity also plagues unconscionability; in fact, that may be 
the root of the doctrine’s infirmities. Aside from its use in recent arbitration 
cases, judges historically have not favored the doctrine, even in an era where 
consumer-targeted adhesionary standard form contracts abound. E. 
Allan Farnsworth described unconscionability’s “arrested development” 
and short-lived promise as one of the “top ten” developments of contract 
law in the 1980s.15 Farnsworth observed that statutory regimes displaced the 
common law conception of unconscionability in the consumer arena and 
it proved an unremarkable doctrine to govern commercial transactions.16 
Lamentably, unconscionability apparently did not even have an effect on 
an errant litigant in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture.17 In the wake 
of that case, student author Eben Colby found that the furniture store 
continued to “‘push[] the envelope’ of legal contracts, repeatedly making 
slight changes to their contracts so as to stay one step ahead of the courts.”18 
Even so weakened, unconscionability’s detractors still regard it as a 
dangerous and destructive force in contract law.19 As Jeff Stempel observed, 
“many scholars have suggested that unconscionability is simply too 
plastic a concept that permits too much post-hoc judicial meddling with 
contracts.”20 In the eyes of critics, unconscionability, in the guise of fairness, 
allows judges too much latitude to substitute the ends they desire for the 
free will of the parties. After its promising beginning, Stempel attributed 
unconscionability’s now diminished state to a confluence of five factors 
 
 13. In his seminal article, Leff described the dual aspects of unconscionability—procedural and 
substantive—as two “legitimate” interests of contract law, “bargaining naughtiness as ‘procedural 
unconscionability,’ and . . . the resulting contract as ‘substantive unconscionability.’” Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 485, 487 (1967). 
 14. See Part I.A.2. 
 15. Farnsworth, supra note 7, at 222–23. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Student author Eben Colby examined the aftermath of the landmark Williams v. Walker-Thomas 
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). He pessimistically concluded that the case had little effect on 
the business practices of the furniture store. Eben Colby, Note, What Did the Doctrine of Unconscionability 
Do to the Walker-Thomas Furniture Company?, 34 Conn. L. Rev. 625, 656–60 (2002). He noted that Walker-
Thomas continued to relentlessly pursue writs of replevin against defaulting customers as a lesson to other 
customers. Id. 
 18. Colby, supra note 17, at 660. 
 19. See Stempel, supra note 6, at 763. 
 20. Id. 
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within law, politics, and society. Stempel asserted that unconscionability’s 
disfavor can be blamed on “an academic assault” on the doctrine that 
characterized it as amorphous and standardless, together with a return to 
a “textualist, formalist version of classical contract interpretation,” the 
ascendancy of the law and economics movement, a political and societal 
tide of distrust of law and litigation, and a particular revulsion for 
excessive judicial discretion and activism.21 
The unconscionability doctrine nevertheless “survives to protect . . . 
fairness norms”22 and to serve as a last-ditch judicial “safety net to catch 
cases of contractual injustice.”23 Part I of this Article discusses 
unconscionability’s functions and exposes several of the doctrine’s 
weaknesses in the service of contracting fairness. Part II explores 
suggestions advanced by several contract scholars to judicially fine-tune 
the unconscionability doctrine to better enable it to fulfill its purpose. 
Most of these are within the grasp of a determined common law judge. 
For example, to make unconscionability more vital and robust, more 
courts might follow those few courts that entertain unconscionability as 
an affirmative claim that can be brought by a victim, as well as an 
affirmative defense. At the very least, in appropriate cases, courts might 
consider a broader range of equitable remedies in addition to 
nonenforcement, and particularly, allow declaratory relief and 
restitution. Expanding the range of remedies afforded to victims 
recognizes that unconscionability can cause financial harm that cannot be 
adequately compensated by mere nonenforcement. The exposure to an 
award of damages, even simple restitution, or attorneys’ fees may be 
needed when the unconscionable term has caused the victim to incur 
loss. Moreover, the threat of real damages may also deter 
unconscionable actors. 
Next, courts should acknowledge that unconscionability is close kin 
to illegality. Like other forms of illegality, unconscionable contracts, 
particularly adhesionary form contracts, have negative impacts beyond 
 
 21. Id. at 813. Leff’s seminal critique of unconscionability provided a persuasive cautionary 
narrative that any strong form of unconscionability threatened freedom of contract and amounted to 
unwelcome judicial meddling in private agreements. See generally Leff, supra note 13. Stempel observed 
that Leff’s article has been widely cited in law review articles, judicial opinions, and law school texts. 
He surmised, “Although Leff did not eradicate the unconscionability norm, he clearly cut it down to 
size, both in the academy and, I posit, the courts.” Stempel, supra note 6, at 818. Stempel also observed 
that unconscionability withered under a “resurgence of classical contract law, textualism, and formalism” 
at work in the law of contracts by the 1970s and ’80s that were “inhospitable to unconscionability.” Id. at 
821–22. The dominating influence of “law and economics” in contract law contributed to unconscionability’s 
fall as well. Adherents assert that the quest for efficiency means that marketplace actors left to their own 
devices will create mutually beneficial contracts, without judicial intermeddling. Id. at 823–24. Finally, 
political animosity toward both “judicial activism” and against litigation more generally all contributed to 
unconscionability’s decline. Id. at 827–29. 
 22. Schmitz, supra note 3, at 74. 
 23. Id. 
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the parties. Pervasive unconscionability undermines basic principles of 
contract law and exacts social harm by “undermin[ing] our system of 
contract enforcement.”24 Therefore, in appropriate cases, courts might 
liberally fashion remedies to deter future unconscionability. To further 
strengthen the doctrine, courts must acknowledge that they hold an 
inherent power to raise unconscionability sua sponte.25 
Most importantly, courts must embrace unconscionability for the 
flexible standard that it was intended to be, and recognize it as a doctrine 
intended to police and define the essence of bargaining fairness. Recent 
arbitration cases reveal that unconscionability can be a robust common 
law doctrine that insists upon contracting fairness and justice. 
Unconscionability’s vagueness and flexibility do not endanger contract 
law; instead, like good faith and fair dealing, unconscionability is a standard 
of essential contracting fairness that has been entrusted to the common law. 
I.  Unconscionability’s Infirmities 
This Part considers aspects of unconscionability as now constructed 
that diminish it as a policing doctrine in disputes between weaker and 
stronger parties, where the advantaged party may have exacted unfair terms 
by heavy-handed means. As a preliminary matter, because it is a common 
law device for deciding single cases, the unconscionability doctrine cannot 
be expected to be as effective as legislation to eradicate unfair business 
practices that permeate specific industries. However, unconscionability can 
serve as a sentry to call lawmakers to action to legislate and regulate 
against systemic abuses. Additionally, unconscionability remains vital even 
when regulatory schemes are implemented. First, regulations will never 
be able to fully account for evolving contracting practices. In addition, 
statutes often utilize the concept of unconscionability to define prohibited 
conduct.26 But, unconscionability misses its normative potential even as a 
common law doctrine because it is a weak signaling device, both to the 
legislature and to players in the marketplace. 
 
 24. Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural Unconscionability, 
34 Cumb. L. Rev. 11, 14 (2003). 
 25. See infra notes 155–158 and accompanying text. 
 26. Unconscionability, as a standard of fairness, has a life beyond its common law roots. For all 
the criticism of unconscionability as a vague common law doctrine, it has developed as a statutory 
standard as well. For example, consumer protection statutes often prohibit “unconscionable” behavior 
or contracting. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. § 501.204 (2015) (Florida’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act prohibits unconscionable practices or acts); see also Kathleen S. Morris, Expanding Local Enforcement 
of State and Federal Consumer Protection Laws, 40 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1903, 1928–49 (2013) (providing a 
50 state survey which notes that Idaho, Michigan, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, and Oklahoma each 
prohibit unconscionable practices under the state’s deceptive trade practice acts). 
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A. Unconscionability as a Faint Clarion Call 
The adjudication of unconscionability claims (whether successful or 
not) can serve as a signaling device—an expression by litigants and 
judges that legislation is needed to correct bargaining abuses. The saga of 
franchising illustrates how common law courts refereeing claims of 
unconscionability might signal to lawmakers that a legislative “fix” is in 
order. Franchises proliferated as a contractual business relationship after 
World War II.27 Disputes have abounded because of the great disparity in 
economic power and information between franchisees and franchisors. 
Early cases, litigated under the common law, revealed that the common 
law judge could do little to police this business relationship; nevertheless, 
the volume of cases filed and judicial decisions issued were part of the 
stimulus for a legislative response.28 
Four general observations about franchising and unconscionability 
are noteworthy. First, the franchisor-franchisee relationship is typically 
grossly unequal. The franchisor is often a mega-corporation that markets 
ubiquitous products such as fast food, clothing, or gasoline, and typically 
possesses vastly more economic power, information, and sophistication 
than the aspiring franchisee. The powerful franchisor drafts a one-sided, 
nonnegotiable agreement and presents it to the prospective franchisee.29 
The franchisees, on the other hand, “typically, but not always, are small 
businessmen or businesswomen . . . seeking to make the transition from 
being wage earners and for whom the franchise is their very first business.”30 
As a result, franchisees have little bargaining power or inside information.31 
Second, franchises sprang up largely unregulated, and these enterprises 
continue in a lightly regulated milieu, where disclosure requirements are 
 
 27. Franchises today represent 3.5% of the gross domestic product. IHS Global Insight, Int’l 
Franchise Ass’n, Franchise Business Economic Outlook for 2014, at 19 (2014), available at 
http://franchiseeconomy.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Franchise_Business_Outlook_January_2014-1-
13-13.pdf. 
 28. Franchising arose as an innovative, dynamic marketing and distribution model in the post-World 
War II era. See Boyd Allan Byers, Note, Making a Case for Federal Regulation of Franchise Terminations—
A Return-of-Equity Approach, 19 J. Corp. L. 607, 614–15 (1994) (describing rise of franchising as a 
dominant business retail distribution model). Franchising is a poster child for Ian Macneil’s “relational 
contract.” See generally Ian R. Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); Ian R. Macneil, 
Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 483. In simple terms, a franchisor, 
by contract, grants a franchisee a right to distribute its product and/or to use its business format for their 
mutual profit and benefit. Product distribution franchises authorize the franchisee to distribute the 
franchisor’s product, while a business format franchise allows the franchisee to “replicate the franchisor’s 
successful business formula at the franchised location.” Byers, supra, at 613–14. 
 29. See Paul Steinberg & Gerald Lescatre, Beguiling Heresy: Regulating the Franchise Relationship, 
109 Penn St. L. Rev. 105, 125–27 (2004) (describing inequalities generally). 
 30. Id. at 107 (quoting Postal Instant Press, Inc. v. Sue Sealy, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 373 (Ct. App. 1996)). 
 31. Id. 
O - Beh_17 (EGK) (1) (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2015 12:07 AM 
1018 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:1011 
more common than more heavy-handed regulations.32 Third, the history 
of franchises is checkered at best. As one commentator described its 
unregulated roots, “[f]ranchising became a jungle, where jungle law 
ruled” and “fraud prevailed.”33 Finally, although franchisors and franchisees 
each benefit from their mutual success, their interests are imperfectly 
aligned throughout the life of the contract.34 
In the largely lawless era of the 1960s and 1970s, contract law 
provided the playbook by which to resolve disputes arising out of this 
economically complex, conflicted, and unequal relationship. Even today, 
despite an increase in state and federal regulation, contract law remains 
important to moderate franchise disputes.35 At first blush, one might 
conclude that normative principles of contract law embodied in standards 
such as unconscionability and good faith and fair dealing, are well suited 
to police abusive franchisors. But contract doctrines available to judges 
slogging case-by-case, clause-by-clause, and industry-by-industry, have 
proven inadequate, either to right injustice in individual cases or to correct 
widespread fairness issues that afflict these far reaching enterprises. 
The early case of Division of the Triple T Service, Inc. v. Mobil Oil 
Corporation36 illustrates the twin failings of contract law—both to fix 
industry-wide oppressive dealings and to achieve justice in a single case. 
In the end, it shows how courts can surrender with a plea to lawmakers to 
take over. Triple T involved Mobil Oil’s unilateral termination of a gas 
station franchise agreement pursuant to the franchise agreement, despite the 
franchisee’s successful operation of the station without breach of contract.37 
Triple T, the franchisee, had operated a Mobil Oil station for six years 
under a “standard form” lease and franchise agreement that was “common 
to the industry.”38 Mobil Oil unilaterally invoked the termination provisions 
that allowed it to terminate the franchise, with ninety-days notice, without 
 
 32. Byers, supra note 28, at 623–24 (describing Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) disclosure 
regime and patchwork of industry-specific or general state franchise laws that provide some substantive 
regulation during the franchise). 
 33. Howard Yale Lederman, Franchising and Franchise Law, 92 Mich. B.J. 34, 35 (2013). 
 34. Interests are not aligned during the formation stage. An imbalance of information, economic 
power, and sophistication provide a fertile field for fraud, misrepresentation, and the inclusion of one-
sided terms. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 29, at 125, 174 (describing pre-sale conflicts). During the 
life of the franchise, interests are not aligned, for example, regarding the scope of the franchisee’s territory. A 
franchisor may benefit from encroaching into the franchisees territory in order to maximize its own 
profits at the expense of the franchisee. See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community 
Standard, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 779, 782–83 (2010). Franchise disputes arise at termination over the 
grounds for terminating and methodology of untangling the business interests. See generally Steinberg, 
& Lescatre, supra note 29 (describing disputes from the start to conclusion of the franchise relationship). 
 35. See generally Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 29 (describing friction points in relationship in 
the pre-sale negotiations, post-sales relationship, and termination process). 
 36. 304 N.Y.S.2d 191 (App. Div. 1969). 
 37. Id. at 194. 
 38. Id. 
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cause. For its six-year efforts operating the Mobil franchise, all Triple T 
was to receive at termination was the return of its security deposit under 
the lease.39 Mobil purportedly had a desire to upgrade the property’s use 
to a diagnostic and repair service center, as opposed to the franchisee’s 
more basic service station.40 Among other claims, the franchisee asserted 
that the termination provision was unconscionable and that terminating 
without cause violated the implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing 
found in every contract. The court, with some acknowledged regret, 
rejected both claims. As to invoking the one-sided termination provision, 
the court honored freedom of contract principles over fairness, explaining 
that “[e]very man is presumed to be capable of managing his own affairs, 
and whether his bargains are wise or unwise, is not ordinarily a legitimate 
subject of inquiry.”41 It thus refused to inject good faith into an expressly 
at-will termination clause because doing so would contradict the agreement. 
As to the alleged unconscionability of the agreement, the court explained 
that the termination provision was not so inherently unfair as to be 
unconscionable, in part because it conformed to commercial reasonableness 
at least under some circumstances.42 
Taking note of the failure of federal and state legislative efforts to 
regulate these agreements, the court concluded with a plea to lawmakers: 
The Court is not unsympathetic to plaintiff’s plight but ‘(s)tability of 
contract obligations must not be undermined by judicial sympathy.’ It has 
been the sacredness of contractual obligations which has prevented courts 
of equity from imposing justice in many circumstances. Nevertheless, it is 
anticipated that ameliorative legislation covering business distributorships 
will shortly be a reality and perhaps this very case may provide the 
stimulus necessary [for] enactment. Copies of the opinion shall be sent 
the appropriate legislative committees. The Court cannot legislate and 
is constrained to grant defendant’s motion and deny plaintiff’s motion 
despite the apparent inequities.43 
Bowing at the altar of freedom of contract, the court sacrificed 
unconscionability and good faith and fair dealing. In doing so, the court 
surrendered, conceding itself not up to the task of refereeing contracts 
between grossly unequal parties. 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 198. 
 42. Id. The court’s construction of unconscionability required a showing of substantive 
unconscionability prior to any inquiry into procedural unfairness. Id. at 201. 
 43. Id. at 204 (citations omitted). Not all courts followed this view; some demanded good faith 
even in an at-will termination case. See, e.g., B.E. deTreville v. Outboard Marine Corp., 439 F.2d 1099, 
1100 (4th Cir. 1971) (applying South Carolina law and holding an at-will termination of a franchise 
may not be for an “unconscionable reason” or “contrary to equity and good conscience”); Tele-
Controls, Inc. v. Ford Indus., Inc., 388 F.2d 48, 51 (7th Cir. 1967) (applying Oregon law and holding a 
termination of franchise must be in good faith). 
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Congress and state legislatures received the message from the courts 
and the victims of unfair franchise agreements and began to impose some 
regulations aimed at fairness, yet these efforts have proved inadequate as 
well. Today, franchising is regulated through federal regulation44 and a 
patchwork of state regulation.45 The regulation of franchises remains spotty; 
laws are typically directed at mandatory disclosures or targeted at 
particular industries.46 Only a few states have specific laws that regulate 
the ongoing relationship and termination.47 Therefore, franchisees continue 
to rely upon the common law doctrines of unconscionability and good faith 
and fair dealing to fill gaps and referee disputes.48 Although franchise 
agreements typically heavily favor the franchisor, in tallying the outcomes 
of unconscionability claims, one commentator noted how inadequate the 
unconscionability doctrine has been: 
Provisions of the franchise agreement are rarely truly unconscionable. 
Courts are unlikely to find express termination provisions 
unconscionable—even when they permit termination without cause—
because the franchise is between business persons and because the 
parties enter the agreement on their own volition. Unconscionability 
doctrine is therefore ill-suited to deal with fairness issues in the 
ongoing franchise relationship.49 
As commentators have complained, unfairness continues to plague the 
franchise industry and “there is regulatory inaction and constraints on the 
ability to rectify the abuses permitted under contracts of adhesion.”50 
Because contract litigation has proven so ineffective to police franchises, 
there remains a push by franchisees to strengthen regulatory oversight of 
franchise agreements, and a resignation to the inadequacy of contract law’s 
policing doctrines.51 The franchise saga reveals that neither legislation nor 
 
 44. See FTC Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 16 C.F.R. § 436 (2015). 
 45. See Byers, supra note 28, at 622–33 (describing federal and state franchise laws). 
 46. See id. at 626–37 (discussing federal laws targeting automobile and petroleum franchises, and 
state laws targeting the same, as well as “an array of industries”). 
 47. Id. at 624–26. 
 48. See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 34, at 820–21. 
 49. Byers, supra note 28, at 635. The commentator’s views on the effectiveness of good faith and 
fair dealing are similar, although he notes some success under state constructions of good faith. 
However, reviewing the doctrine’s overall effectiveness in overseeing termination disputes, the author 
comments, “[t]he franchisor may thus by careful drafting circumvent this implied covenant by explicitly 
setting forth in the franchise agreement the right to terminate without cause.” Id. at 633; see also Steinberg & 
Lescatre, supra note 29, at 112–14 (arguing for stronger federal regulation of franchises, complaining that 
the American judicial conceptualization of good faith is “too narrow” and “judicial or arbitral application 
of equitable principles” as “insufficient” to account for “the consequences of opportunistic behavior”). 
 50. Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 29, at 107. 
 51. See generally Byers, supra note 28 (calling for federal regulation in franchise terminations); 
Steinberg & Lescatre, supra note 29, at 314 (calling for strengthened federal regulation of franchises). 
Good faith and fair dealing does not adequately oversee the franchise relationship, as shown in Triple T, 
where the court showed reluctance to override the express terms of the contract with an implied term of 
good faith. See Byers, supra note 28, at 632–33. Unconscionability is ineffective because, although a 
provision may have an unfair result, there is a presumption of assent to the term. Id. at 635. 
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the common law alone can tame sharp business practices; and even 
together they may prove ineffective.52 
B. Unconscionability’s Withered Normative Influence 
This Subpart discusses some impediments to unconscionability as a 
normative device to affect future behavior. First, unconscionability is widely 
construed as an affirmative defense only; and its remedy limited to 
nonenforcement. Second, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility 
does not preclude or even discourage a lawyer’s inclusion of 
unconscionable clauses in contracts as a matter of basic professional 
conduct. Third, unlike the illegality doctrine, where courts often consider 
the effect on other parties and future contracting behavior in fashioning 
a remedy, this deterrent concept appears less developed in 
unconscionability. 
To the extent that unconscionability is aimed at identifying and 
correcting bad bargaining behavior that achieves undesirable ends, this 
Subpart asks why unconscionability has lacked the might to eradicate 
Leff’s “naughtiness” and resulting “evil.” One must remember that 
contract transactions are largely self-regulated, so any normative effect 
unconscionability has in the marketplace must be as a deterrent. As the 
Knapp, Crystal, and Prince first year contracts text reminds us: 
On any given day, the number of individual contracts entered into in 
even one of the United States must number in the millions. Of that 
huge total, a tiny fraction—but still a large number, in absolute terms—
will eventually give rise to a dispute between the parties. Of these 
relatively few disputes, the overwhelming majority will be resolved 
without even coming to the threshold of a court, much less to judgment 
or a decision on appeal.53 
 
 52. Grant Gilmore observed a rise of statutory regimes in the 1950s and warned of the difficulties 
this trend brings, commenting:  
We are just beginning to face up to the consequences of this orgy of statute making. One of 
the facts of legislative life . . . is that getting a statue enacted in the first place is much easier 
than getting the statute revised so that it will make sense in light of changed conditions. 
 Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 86 (1977). He continued, explaining that once statutes 
take over a subject, courts take on a limited role. Id. at 97 (“Once the legislature has taken over a field, 
only the legislature can effect any further change.”). Even when the statute fails, the assumption is that “a 
court must bow to the legislative command, however absurd, however unjust, however wicked.” Id. 
  Newer consumer issues, such as subprime mortgages, see Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of 
Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1035 
(2010), and payday lending, see Sarah Howard Jenkins, Fringe Economy Lending and Other Aberrant 
Contracts: Introduction, 89 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 3 (2014), demonstrate that, as with franchise agreements, 
there will always be a role for both legislation and judicial oversight where there is a gross imbalance of 
contracting power. 
 53. Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal, & Harry G. Prince, Problems in Contract Law: 
Cases and Materials 16–17 (7th ed. 2012). 
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Since judicial oversight of contracting is the exception, rather than the rule, 
whatever normative pressure the judicial construction of unconscionability 
can infuse into the contracting process must derive from the possibility 
that an adverse judicial decision or other sanction is not worth the risk, even 
knowing that few contracts are subjected to litigation. Yet unconscionability 
poses only a small threat to the more powerful contracting party because, 
as a rule, its remedies are feeble and there are few consequences to 
unconscionable actors and their lawyers. 
1. Meager Remedies 
The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) and the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts each provide for some form of nonenforcement 
when a contract or term is unconscionable, but are not clear that 
nonenforcement represents an expansion or a limitation on remedial 
action. Under U.C.C. section 2-302 and Restatement (Second) section 
208, when a court determines that a contract or a clause within a contract 
is unconscionable, the court is empowered to “refuse to enforce the 
contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any 
unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”54 Nothing 
explicitly precludes other remedies. 
Because the U.C.C. and the Restatement affirmatively grant courts 
these nonenforcement powers, most courts interpret these powers 
narrowly,55 taking the view that unconscionability is only defensive and 
equitable, and that the only remedy available to those harmed by an 
unconscionable provision or contract is nonenforcement of the contract, 
in whole or in part.56 Agreeing with this restrictive reading, Farnsworth 
 
 54. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981). 
 55. This is considered the majority position. See 1 William D. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial 
Code Series § 2-302:5 (2013) (“[M]ost courts have found that Section 2-302 does not provide authority 
to award damages for use of an unconscionable contract or clause.”). 
 56. Courts, for the most part, have accepted that unconscionability is purely defensive and cannot 
be used as an action for damages. See, e.g., Cowin Equip. Co., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 734 F.2d 
1581, 1582 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that unconscionability is defensive and equitable, and “the cases 
which have addressed the issue have consistently rejected the theory that damages may be collected 
for an unconscionable contract provision, citing the language of § 2-302 and its common law precursor 
to demonstrate that § 2-302 was not intended to provide a basis for damage recovery”); Hunter v. 
Sterling Bank, Inc., No. 09–172 (FLW), 2011 WL 5921388 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2011) (dismissing 
unconscionability claim where plaintiffs sought damages against mortgage broker); see also Givens v. 
Rent-A-Center, 720 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D. Ala. 1988) (“[D]amages are not recoverable under a 
theory of unconscionability.”); Johnson v. Long Beach Mortg. Loan Trust 2001-4, 451 F. Supp. 2d 16 
(2006) (holding that on a finding of unconscionability courts do not grant restitution or money damages but 
are limited to refusing enforcement). Langemeier v. Nat’l Oats, Inc., 775 F.2d 975 (8th Cir. 1985), is a 
noteworthy exception. There, the lower court raised the unconscionability doctrine sua sponte in a 
commercial sales contract for the purchase of popcorn. Id. at 976. The lower court then found a clause 
that allowed the buyer to reject the popcorn unilaterally unconscionable and refused its enforcement. Id. 
As a result of refusing enforcement, the court awarded expectation damages to the seller that amounted 
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explained, “[b]ecause the remedies for unconscionability are cast in 
terms of withholding relief instead of avoidance, there is no inherent 
requirement that the claimant make restitution, as the claimant must in 
the case of avoidance for misrepresentation or duress.”57 
The judicial view that equitable remedies other than 
nonenforcement are precluded weakens the doctrine immeasurably.58 
Many courts that steadfastly hold that nonenforcement is the only 
remedy for unconscionability allow illogical results,59 and this view 
renders unconscionability worthless against dominant parties who have 
already obtained their ill-gotten benefits.60 
However, Harry G. Prince called this narrow reading a “fallacious 
view”61 based upon a “simplistic reading”62 of U.C.C. section 2-302 that 
produces illogical results. He pointed out that the actual language of section 
2-302 does not insist that unconscionability be merely defensive. He 
explained: 
The distinction between defensive and offensive use is illogical and 
should be discarded because it may well result in only one of two similarly 
situated parties being unable to make use of the unconscionability 
doctrine. For example, if two parties purchase appliances from door-to-
door salespersons for outrageously and indefensibly exorbitant prices 
 
to “the difference between the contract price and the amount received.” Id. Thus, by striking the clause, 
the court awarded damages for breach of contract. 
 57. E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.28, at 596 (3d ed. 2004); see also 
Joseph M. Perillo, Calamari & Perillo on Contracts § 9.39, at 338 (6th ed. 2009) (stating that although an 
increasing judicial willingness to reform unconscionable contracts, unequivocally stating, “unconscionability 
does not create a cause of action for damages”). But see James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform 
Commercial Code § 5-8, at 237–38 (6th ed. 2010). James White and Robert Summers asserted that 2-
302 does not limit courts to nonenforcement merely by expressly providing for nonenforcement 
remedies. Id. White and Summers also alluded to “as yet undeveloped possibilities for other remedies such 
as injunction and punitive damages.” Id. § 5-3, at 221. 
 58. Compare Camp v. Telco Ala. Credit Union, No. 2:12–cv–2237–LSC, 2013 WL 2106727 (N.D. 
Ala. May 13, 2013) (refusing to recognize a cause of action for declaratory relief “because unconscionability 
is merely an affirmative defense, there is no actual controversy between the parties, and a 
declaratory judgment would not be appropriate”); Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. 
Fla. 1979) (unconscionability does not allow affirmative recovery of money damages or restitution); 
Alboyacian v. BP Prods. N. Am., Civ. No. 9–5143, 2011 WL 5873039 (D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2011) (dismissing 
unconscionability count where plaintiffs sought injunction to prevent termination of an allegedly 
unconscionable franchise termination provision); Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 714 P.2d 1049 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1986) (unconscionability is not a basis for affirmative relief), with In re Checking Overdraft 
Litigation, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (allowing the claim for declaratory relief and 
return of funds on a claim of unconscionability in a case where the bank retained (rather than sued for 
collection) the customer’s money as an overdraft penalty so that without a declaratory action “the 
customer never has the opportunity to raise unconscionability as a defense for nonpayment”). 
 59. See Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint and Consistency, 
46 Hastings L.J. 459, 548 (1995) (“The ‘defensive use only’ rule is artificial, is based on a simplistic reading 
of Section 2-302, and does not effectively administer the policy underlying the unconscionability concept.”). 
 60. See Best, 714 P.2d at 1055–56 (citing cases and denying restitution on the grounds that the 
contract terms allowing excessive charges to bank’s customers was unconscionable). 
 61. Prince, supra note 59, at 545. 
 62. Id. at 548. 
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as a result of sharp dealing, the party who purchases on credit can refuse 
to pay and then use the unconscionability doctrine defensively to fend 
off a claim by the seller for payment. The party who has cash and is able 
to pay on delivery cannot use unconscionability to obtain a partial refund 
of the price or to rescind the transaction altogether under the approach 
that blindly denies affirmative relief on a claim of unconscionability.63 
When U.C.C. section 2-302 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
section 208 are interpreted to limit the outcome of unconscionability to 
nonenforcement and to preclude other remedies, particularly restitution, 
unconscionability packs little punch. 
Some courts have adopted a less constrained position, following the 
general rubric that affirmative defenses, including unconscionability, can 
be raised through declaratory relief and that restitution might be sought.64 
As one court explained in a case involving an unconscionable home loan, 
if declaratory relief, restitution, and reformation are unavailable, the 
result could constitute its own form of unconscionability: 
Thus, the Court finds that unconscionability may be an affirmative 
claim if pleaded correctly. To find otherwise would be to hold that a 
party who has entered into an unconscionable contract would have to 
breach it, get sued, and raise unconscionability as a defense before the 
Court may examine the enforceability of the contract. Moreover, in the 
event that the defense of unconscionability is unsuccessful, then the 
losing party is left to deal with the consequences of the breach which, 
in this case, may be a monetary judgment in addition to the loss of the 
home to foreclosure. The ability of the party suspecting unconscionability 
to raise that issue in a declaratory judgment action or in an action for 
reformation permits the party to both comply with the contract as 
written, thus avoiding the consequences of a breach, and still obtain a 
declaration as to the enforceability of the contract. In this Court’s 
opinion, the law favors the latter.65 
 
 63. Id. at 485–86. 
 64. In re Checking Overdraft Litigation, 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (S.D. Fla. 2010), recognized that it 
was defying traditional limitations in its holding that would allow it to declare a term unconscionable 
and then to award restitution: 
Finally, Defendants appear to be correct in their assertion that, ordinarily, unconscionability 
is properly asserted as a defense to a contract rather than an affirmative cause of action. But 
this is not the ordinary case. An ordinary case in this factual context would be one in which 
the customer allegedly overdraws his or her account, the bank provides the overdraft service, 
and then the bank demands payment of the overdraft fee from the customer. Then, when the 
customer refuses to pay, the bank sues the customer for breach of contract, and the customer 
at that time can raise an unconscionability defense to the enforcement of the contract. In the 
instant case, however, the bank is never required to file suit because it is already in possession 
of the customer’s money, and simply collects the fee by debiting the customer’s account. Thus, 
the customer never has the opportunity to raise unconscionability as a defense for nonpayment. 
The only opportunity to do so is through a lawsuit filed by the customer, after payment has 
been made. Hence, the facts of the instant case weigh in favor of permitting Plaintiffs to pursue 
an unconscionability claim. 
Id. at 1318–19. 
 65. Eva v. Midwest Nat’l Mortg. Banc, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 862, 896–97 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
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If a court construes unconscionability to allow only prospective 
nonenforcement, victims may lose, even if they establish 
unconscionability. For example, without a broad range of equitable 
remedies, a victim who overpays under an unconscionable term has no 
means to get the overpayment returned.66 If the victim is not sued 
affirmatively for default, she may not be able to reform the contract or 
obtain declaratory relief to avoid an unconscionable provision.67 
Notably, neither the Restatement nor the U.C.C. expressly limits 
unconscionability’s remedy to nonenforcement. Courts simplistically infer 
this limitation from the fact that the U.C.C. and the Restatement 
specifically allow judicial discretion to choose among nonenforcement 
remedies.68 The Restatement does not state that unconscionability is 
exclusively defensive. The Restatement commentary notes that a defensive 
remedial role for unconscionability is the “simplest application” and the 
“appropriate remedy . . . ordinarily.”69 This language is not necessarily 
restrictive and instead might be viewed as expanding a judge’s discretionary 
authority to include nonenforcement. The implication of the commentary is 
most certainly that nonenforcement may be the “simplest application” but 
leaves open the possibility of other remedies in appropriate circumstances. 
2. It Is Not Unethical for Lawyers to Assist Clients in Imposing an 
Unconscionable Term 
One might hope that as a society we believe that the fairness values 
that undergird unconscionability ought to be present in every contract. 
However, the law governing attorney conduct undermines that premise 
by narrowly fixating on the lawyer’s obligation to avoid affirmative fraud 
 
 66. Consider Jones v. Star Credit, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969), in which a price term was held 
to be unconscionable. Although the court allowed reformation of the contract on a suit brought by the 
buyer, by the time the buyers filed suit for reformation, they had paid $619.88 and had a balance of 
$819.81 for the purchase of a freezer with a retail value of about $300. Id. at 265. Without an order for 
restitution, Star Credit could retain its ill-gotten gain. 
 67. The Walker-Thomas Furniture lawsuit, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), reveals the problem 
with an exclusive nonenforcement remedy. At the end of the lawsuit, Williams and Thorne, the debtors, 
could only achieve the damages they deserved by way of court-approved settlement. The lawsuit was 
filed in 1963 and finally concluded in 1967. Had the suit concluded without settlement, nonenforcement of 
the unconscionable clause and the resulting replevin might only have allowed the defendants to reclaim 
their purchased items. As one of the attorneys explained in 1968:  
[t]he idea of compromise and settlement inevitably arose before the cases came to trial. Ora 
Lee Williams and the Thornes had gradually been able to replace the items seized from them 
in 1963 and were not interested in having them returned. In both cases the defendants were 
paid what was considered the reasonable value of the seized items after being used by the 
defendants prior to the replevin by plaintiff.  
Pierre E. Dostert, Appellate Restatement of Unconscionability: Civil Legal Aid at Work, 54 A.B.A. J. 1183, 
1186 (1968). 
 68. Another way to interpret this positive grant of discretion not to enforce the provision is that 
without it, courts would not have discretion to cherry pick what they would strike within a contract. 
 69. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. g (1981). 
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and deceit rather than providing a code of conduct that challenges lawyers 
not to be instruments of unconscionable contracting. The American Bar 
Association’s (“ABA”) Model Rules of Professional Conduct largely 
guide the conduct of lawyers in the United States.70 The Model Rules are 
highly protective of the ideal of zealous advocacy and the adversary 
system. As one commentator observed, “[t]hese Rules assume the primacy 
of the adversarial system for reaching the truth and rendering justice, and 
merely set an essentially amoral floor for attorney professionalism.”71 
“Myopically” “client-centered”72 in regulating transactional practice, the 
Rules prohibit a lawyer’s participation in affirmative fraud and some 
conduct that borders on fraud.73 Model Rule 1.2(d) provides that a 
lawyer may not counsel or assist a client to engage in fraudulent or 
criminal conduct.74 Rule 4.1 demands that lawyers be truthful to others 
when acting on behalf of clients,75 but limits disclosure responsibilities 
unless it is “necessary to avoid a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.”76 
And finally, Rule 8.4(c) broadly prohibits conduct involving “dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”77  
There is little within the professional code to prohibit lawyers from 
participating in the drafting of unfair, oppressive, and one-sided contract 
provisions without more.78 In fact, the Hazard and Hodes treatise, The 
 
 70. The American Bar Association tallies state adoptions of the Model Rules. California is the only 
state that has not adopted “the format” of the Model Rules. Am. Bar Assoc. CPR Policy Implementation 
Comm., State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Comments 6 n.1 (2011), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments.authcheckdam.pdf. However, 
many states have customized either the rules or the commentary within their jurisdiction. See 
Christopher M. Fairman, Protecting Consumers: Attorney Ethics and the Law Governing Lawyers, 
60 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 529, 529–30 (2006); Amy J. Schmitz, Ethical Considerations in Drafting 
and Enforcing Consumer Arbitration Clauses, 49 S. Tex. L. Rev. 841, 847 (2008). 
 71. Schmitz, supra note 70, at 847. 
 72. Id. at 849. 
 73. The Rules provide that it is misconduct to “engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation.” The Rules further prohibit counseling or assisting a client to engage in fraudulent 
or criminal conduct. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R 1.2(d) (2013). Rule 4.1 requires lawyers to be 
truthful to others when acting on behalf of a client, but stops short of demanding disclosure, unless it is 
“necessary to avoid criminal or fraudulent act by a client.” See generally Christina L. Kunz, The Ethics of 
Invalid and “Iffy” Contract Clauses, 40 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 487 (2006). 
 74. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(d) (2013). 
 75. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1(a) (2013). 
 76. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1(b) (2013). 
 77. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(c) (2013).  
 78. See Kunz, supra note 73, at 488 (observing that ethical guidance for lawyers with regard to 
transactions is “thin”). Notably, some state statutes prohibit the inclusion of unconscionable terms, in 
some contexts. For example, California’s Consumer’s Legal Remedies Act prohibits inclusion of 
unconscionable provisions in consumer contracts. Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(19) (West 2014). See David 
Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 605, 
663 (2010) (explaining that Florida and California consumer statutes provide for affirmative remedies 
against unconscionable provisions). 
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Law of Lawyering, discussing Model Rule 1.2(d), poses this specific 
hypothetical: 
The highest court of State recently held that a certain clause in a 
consumer goods contract is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. 
A retail store in State nevertheless insists its lawyer, L, continue to 
include the clause in its contracts, on the grounds that the great 
majority of consumers will not know it is unenforceable and thus will 
comply with its terms anyway.79 
Hazard and Hodes concluded that this conduct is permissible under the 
Model Rules, even when the clause is clearly unenforceable due to a 
precedential ruling in the jurisdiction. They infer this from the drafting 
history of the current Model Rule 1.2(d). In 1982, the Kutak Commission80 
proposed that Rule 1.2(d) provide: 
A lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer 
knows is criminal or fraudulent, or in the preparation of a written 
instrument containing terms the lawyer knows are expressly prohibited 
by law, but a lawyer may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith 
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the 
law.81 
The ABA House of Delegates rejected the portion of Rule 1.2(d) that 
would have prohibited drafting a clearly unconscionable clause in a 
contract, such as that described in a hypothetical posed by Hazard and 
Hodes.82 Hazard and Hodes noted that in the 1983 Midyear Meeting, the 
portion of the proposed rule prohibiting lawyers from preparing an 
instrument “containing terms the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know are legally prohibited” was cut from the final rule.83 From its 
elimination, Hazard and Hodes concluded that Lawyer L “could not now 
be disciplined merely for including the unconscionable clause in the 
contract.”84 Hazard and Hodes equivocated somewhat where the clause 
“is likely to mislead customers as to their rights,” cautioning that “use of 
the clause might be held to constitute fraud.”85 
As to the inclusion of clauses that have questionable validity rather 
than clearly established invalidity, the professional rules are lacking even 
 
 79. 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 5.12, at 5-39, 
illus. 5-13 (3d ed. 2001). 
 80. The ABA charged the Kutak Commission in 1977 to update the laws governing lawyers. The 
ABA House of Delegates debated, revised, and eventually adopted the Model Rules in August 1983. 
See A Legislative History: The Development of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
1982–2013, at vii (Art Garwin ed., 2013). 
 81. Id. at 48. 
 82. Id. at 48–50. 
 83. 1 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 79. 
 84. Id. § 5.12, at 5-40, illus. 5-13. 
 85. Id. Others concur that a clearly invalid clause may reach the “dishonesty” definition 
articulated in Model Rule 8.4. See, e.g., Duhl, supra note 4, at 1016–17. 
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more.86 In the interest of one’s client, it is permissible to include provisions 
that test the limits of the law.87 Paul Carrington, in his provocative essay 
Unconscionable Lawyers, suggested that lawyers for the more powerful 
party in a transaction have responsibilities to consider fairness to the other 
party.88 He warned, “Lawyers who write the forms are not justified in 
zeal” that is “blind to consequences, and they are in serious danger of 
becoming parties to the overreaching of their clients.”89 Carrington 
constructed an argument, in the context of overreaching arbitration clauses, 
that including invalid, oppressive clauses may constitute fraud and lawyer 
misconduct.90 At the same time, he acknowledged that the existing Model 
Code is not clear on this.91 He observed that codes of conduct for lawyers 
from bygone eras, while more generally “scant” on guidance, prohibited 
lawyers from engaging in “fraud or chicanery.”92 Carrington suggested 
that the term “chicanery” might well have included drafting 
“unconscionable provisions that disable parties from enforcing their 
substantive rights.”93 In the modern era, on the other hand, he conceded 
that under the current Model Rules only a “remote possibility” exists 
that anyone might be disciplined.94 Carrington lamented the role lawyers 
play in the drafting of unconscionable clauses in form contracts that 
“disgrace our profession.”95 
3. Judicial Reluctance to Employ Unconscionability to Influence 
Bad Actors 
The unconscionability doctrine recognizes that some contracting 
behaviors and resulting oppressive terms are so undesirable that they cross 
the line of enforceability. It should then follow that courts should (1) not 
be a party to enforcement; (2) not protect the offending party; and (3) not 
encourage such contracting in the future. Yet, unlike the contract illegality 
doctrine, unconscionability is not typically applied to punish wrongdoers 
or deter future behavior. 
Courts typically regard unconscionability purely as an affirmative 
defense, which places the burden on the defendant to plead and prove it. 
On the other hand, whether a contract is void as against public policy96 
 
 86. See Duhl, supra note 4, at 1016–17. 
 87. Kunz, supra note 73, at 494–95. 
 88. Carrington, supra note 4, at 361. 
 89. Id. at 371. 
 90. Id. at 371–73. 
 91. Id. at 379–80. 
 92. Id. at 380.cal 
 93. Id. (discussing ABA Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 15 (1908)). 
 94. Id. at 384. 
 95. Id. at 361. 
 96. For simplification, this will be called “the illegality doctrine” in this Article. 
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may be raised sua sponte by the court.97 The court’s power to raise 
unenforceability on the grounds of public policy is based on the principle 
that courts are guardians of the integrity of the judicial system and must 
not become instruments of illegal contracts.98 
James White and Robert Summers’ treatise on the U.C.C. opined 
that the U.C.C. similarly grants discretionary power to courts to raise 
unconscionability sua sponte. White and Summers asserted, “Although it 
would be useful for the defendant to plead unconscionability as an 
affirmative defense, the words of 2-302(1) also seem to permit a court to 
raise the issue sua sponte.”99 The U.C.C. Official Comments support this 
position as well: “This section is intended to make it possible for the 
courts to police explicitly against the contracts or clauses which they find 
to be unconscionable.”100 
Although a few courts recognize their own discretionary authority 
to raise unconscionability,101 many others disagree.102 “Although 
unconscionability can be decided as a matter of law by the court when it 
is raised, when the issue is neither raised nor briefed . . . a trial court 
should not rule on unconscionability sua sponte.”103 Those courts that 
regard unconscionability merely as an affirmative defense reject the 
 
 97. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts ch. 8, topic 1, intro. note (1981) (“Even if neither 
party’s pleading or proof reveals the contravention, the court may ordinarily inquire into it and decide 
the case on the basis of it . . . .”); Farnsworth, supra note 57, § 5.1, at 8 (“Indeed, even if neither party 
raises the issue, the court will do so on its own initiative and refuse enforcement if justified by the 
record, at least if the contravention is serious.”). 
 98. Farnsworth, supra note 57, § 5.1, at 3 n.4 (citing cases). 
 99.  White & Summers, supra note 57, § 5-3, at 220. 
 100. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2002). Section 2-302 gives the court a leading, rather than supportive, 
role determining unconscionability. It begins, “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable . . . .” Id. Section 2 adds further support to the 
prerogative of the court to raise it “[w]hen it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any 
clause thereof may be unconscionable.” Id. 
 101. In Langemeier v. Nat’l Oats Co., Inc., 775 F.2d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 1985), the court explained, 
“The plain language of subsection (1) permits the court to raise this issue sua sponte. Moreover, 
subsection (2) is written in the disjunctive: ‘[w]hen it is claimed or appears to the court.’” (emphasis 
omitted) (citing and quoting U.C.C. § 2-302)). See also In re Knepp, 229 B.R. 821, 837 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ala. 1999) (recognizing that Alabama law gives courts discretion to raise unconscionability sua sponte). 
 102. See Neiman v. Galloway, 704 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
unconscionability is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved and that trial court should 
not raise it sua sponte); see also Creighton Univ. v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 4:08CV460, 2009 WL 756206, 
at *3 (D. Neb. Mar. 18, 2009) (refusing to consider unconscionability where it has not been pleaded); 
Southworth & McGill, P.A. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 580 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“If 
appellants wished to avoid the plain provisions of the clause limiting liability, it was incumbent upon them to 
plead and prove ‘unconscionability’ . . . .”); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Atl. Indem. Co., 468 
S.E.2d 570, 573 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (“[F]ailure to plead the affirmative defense of unconscionability 
. . . operates to bar its raising of this issue on appeal.”); Guaranteed Foods of Neb., Inc. v. Rison, 299 
N.W.2d 507, 512 (Neb. 1980) (holding that under Nebraska law, “the issue of unconscionability must 
be pleaded in order to be considered by the court”); Rozeboom v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 358 N.W.2d 241, 
246 (S.D. 1984) (holding unconscionability must be asserted, pleaded, and proved). 
 103. Schlaefer v. Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 996 P.2d 745, 748 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). 
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premise that it is within judicial discretion to raise unconscionability on 
their own initiative in the same manner as they might illegality. This 
rejection of judicial authority diminishes unconscionability as the court’s 
own “policing” doctrine.  
The application of unconscionability differs from illegality in yet 
another way. How courts sever an unconscionable term also limits 
unconscionability’s influence on future bargaining behavior, unlike the 
broader discretion courts exercise under illegality. Remedies for illegality 
are permeated with deterrence concerns.104 For example, in the context of 
overly broad employee noncompete clauses analyzed under the illegality 
doctrine, some courts resist reforming or severing offending clauses but 
instead strike the illegal clause in order to discourage overreaching by 
dominant parties going forward.105 When contract clauses offend public 
policy, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 184 comments 
suggest that courts should not exercise discretion to partially enforce a 
provision “unless it appears that [the offending party] made the agreement 
in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.”106 
The Restatement continues: “[A] court will not aid a party who has taken 
advantage of his dominant bargaining power to extract from the other 
party a promise that is clearly so broad as to offend public policy.”107 
Harlan Blake’s influential article in the 1960s, Employee Agreements Not 
to Compete,108 articulated a logic that has appealed to courts over the years. 
Courts now often refuse to sever unreasonable parts of noncompete 
clauses in the employment context specifically to avoid a perverse 
incentive. “If severance is generally applied, employers can fashion truly 
ominous covenants with confidence that they will be pared down and 
enforced when the facts of a particular case are not unreasonable. This 
smacks of having one’s employee’s cake, and eating it too.”109 
 
 104. The Restatement’s Reporter’s Notes specifically caution that partial enforcement is not available to 
those who act in bad faith because of “the potential incentives it will give employers to bargain in bad faith in 
the future.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184 reporter’s note (1981). Likewise, the comment to 
section 182 advises: “In close cases, a court will consider whether denial of recovery will deter the improper 
conduct or, on the contrary, encourage persons engaging in such conduct to enter into transactions knowing 
that their promises are unenforceable.” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 182 cmt. b (1981). 
 105. Farnsworth explained that a bedrock principle of “unenforceability on grounds of public policy” 
is as a “sanction to discourage undesirable conduct, either by the parties or by others.” Farnsworth, 
supra note 57, § 5.1, at 2. 
 106. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184 cmt. b (1981). 
 107. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 184 cmt. b (1981). 
 108. Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 683 (1960). The 
Restatement rejects a blue-lining approach, particularly when the stronger party overreaches in order to 
take advantage of the weaker party and in the case of standard form contracts. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 184 cmt. b (1981). 
 109. Blake, supra note 108, at 683. Citing Blake’s article, the court in Valley Med. Specialists v. 
Farber, 982 P.2d 1277 (Ariz. 1999), struck down an overly broad noncompete clause as against public 
policy and refused to rewrite it as a signal to other employers. Id. at 1286. The court opined that had it 
simply rewritten the noncompete to make it reasonable: “Employers may therefore create ominous 
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Deterrence goals do not guide the construction of unconscionability 
remedies to the same extent that they do in illegality cases. Courts tend 
to favor benign forms of severance of unconscionable terms, rather than 
utilizing severance remedies to serve broader public policies beyond the 
case at issue.110 The Restatement appears to support lesser remedial 
applications, explaining, “the policy is not penal: unless the parties can be 
restored to their precontract positions, the offending party will ordinarily be 
awarded at least the reasonable value of performance rendered by 
him.”111 However, while this comment may support protecting the 
offending party in “ordinary” cases, it does not preclude a judge from 
refusing to protect repeat players who might otherwise habitually offend. 
If a stronger party usually suffers no loss beyond the effect of the 
misconduct, any potential for deterrence of future misconduct is lost. 
 
covenants, knowing that if the words are challenged, courts will modify the agreement to make it 
enforceable.” Id.; see also Richard P. Rita Pers. Services Int’l, Inc. v. Kot, 191 S.E.2d 79, 81 (Ga. 1972); 
Ceramic & Metal Coatings Corp. v. Hizer, 529 S.E.2d 160 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Woodward v. Cadillac 
Overall Supply Co., 240 N.W.2d 710, 719 (Mich. 1976). 
 110. As to the remedies for unconscionability, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts comments, 
“[w]here a term rather than the entire contract is unconscionable, the appropriate remedy is ordinarily 
to deny effect to the unconscionable term” and its comments do not make reference to affecting future 
behavior. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. g (1981); see also Farnsworth, supra note 
57, § 4.28, at 594 (noting that courts generally reserve the option to strike the clause in its entirety rather 
than sever it when unconscionability “infects” or “permeates” the entire clause or contract). 
 111. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 cmt. g (1981). In Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 
205 P.3d 1091, 1098–99 (Alaska 2009), the court considered but rejected an employee’s argument that if a 
threshold provision in an arbitration agreement were held unconscionable the court should not enforce 
any part of the arbitration clause. The court acknowledged that the effect of the ruling had implications 
for the conduct of employers drafting contract provisions in the future, but stated:  
We have no reason to think that Nye and other employers will ignore the precedent created by 
this opinion. If in future cases similar unconscionable clauses are sought to be enforced despite 
our ruling in this case, severance might not be appropriate. For the present, however, the strong 
public policy favoring arbitration points to imposing a severance remedy so that arbitration 
may take place.  
Id. On the other hand, at least in dicta, the California Supreme Court likened unconscionability to 
illegality and took note that merely severing an offending unconscionable provision has the same effect 
on future behavior as an illegal one: 
This reasoning applies with equal force to arbitration agreements that limit damages to be 
obtained from challenging the violation of unwaivable statutory rights. An employer will not 
be deterred from routinely inserting such a deliberately illegal clause into the arbitration 
agreements it mandates for its employees if it knows that the worst penalty for such illegality is 
the severance of the clause after the employee has litigated the matter. In that sense, the 
enforcement of a form arbitration agreement containing such a clause drafted in bad faith 
would be condoning, or at least not discouraging, an illegal scheme, and severance would be 
disfavored unless it were for some other reason in the interests of justice. 
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 697 n.13 (Cal. 2000). 
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II.  Resuscitating Unconscionability 
This Part envisions a more robust and relevant unconscionability 
doctrine. First, it reminds the reader that this stronger version of 
unconscionability does exist, as common law judges have shown in 
arbitration cases. It then considers a variety of suggestions to invigorate 
unconscionability as a safeguard against unfair bargaining. 
A. Evidence That Unconscionability Is Not Dead 
Unconscionability reveals its stronger side in the back and forth 
judicial conversation about arbitration between the U.S. Supreme Court 
and lower courts.112 Unconscionability’s resilience in arbitration cases is 
in part attributed to a judicial awakening that the “unconscionability 
doctrine may be one of the judiciary’s only remaining tools for protection 
of individuals and small businesses”113 against “escalating aggressiveness in 
the drafting of arbitration agreements.”114 Susan Randall observed that in 
the arbitration context, unconscionability was uncharacteristically 
fortified.115 Randall found that the application of unconscionability to 
arbitration cases in the current era departs from the norm in three ways: 
First, judges find unconscionability more often in the arbitration cases. 
Second, judges find specific provisions within arbitration clauses, such as 
choice of law, forum selection, and damage limitations, unconscionable 
more often than when these same provisions are found within non-
arbitration provisions of the contract. Finally, some judges express open 
hostility toward arbitration in their judicial opinions,116 perhaps as a 
signaling device to lawmakers. 
 
 112. See generally Knapp, Blowing the Whistle, supra note 1, at 613; Stempel, supra note 6, at 765–66; 
Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes Toward Arbitration and the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 Buff. 
L. Rev. 185, 188 (2004). Arbitration, perceived as a lower cost, more expedient, more flexible, and 
generally superior dispute resolution regime compared to litigation, has long been favored by merchants. 
However, courts have approached arbitration agreements with suspicion, perceived by some as overt 
hostility, because of the litigation safeguards surrendered in arbitration. See Stempel, supra note 6, at 
771. The Federal Arbitration Act, enacted in 1925, intended to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility 
to arbitration agreements . . . and to place [them] on the same footing as other contracts.” Randall, supra 
note 112, at 185 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp. Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000)). Since then, the 
Supreme Court has advanced an increasingly pro-arbitration stance that has allowed wide swaths of the 
marketplace to essentially opt out of the public legal system to one of private adjudication. 
 113. Randall, supra note 112, at 189. 
 114. Id. at 196; see also Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey, supra note 1, at 319–20, 337–38; 
Stempel, supra note 6, at 776–800 (chronicling the “pro-arbitration regime” advanced in Supreme Court 
decisions over the past twenty-plus years and the energized reaction of lower court judges). 
 115. Randall, supra note 112, at 185–86. 
 116. Id. Knapp has observed similarly: 
[T]he burgeoning application of the FAA triggered a corresponding expansion in the attention 
paid by state courts (and lower federal courts as well) to the doctrine of unconscionability. 
Unable to challenge directly the Supreme Court’s insistence on a strong preference for 
arbitration, parties desiring to avoid being forced to submit to arbitration increasingly mounted 
unconscionability attacks on arbitration clauses, and with increasing success. 
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Mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer contracts raise 
formation, fairness, and substance issues that are the bread and butter of 
contract law; issues that we have long entrusted to common law judges. 
Perhaps this perceived encroachment by federal lawmakers on common 
law courts explains the groundswell of pushback against the “slanted pro-
arbitration doctrinal straightjacket fashioned by Supreme Court.”117 
Perhaps, too, the resurgence of unconscionability reveals that, at least with 
regard to arbitration, judges have reached a tipping point. 
It remains to be seen whether unconscionability will be a formidable 
rear guard action in the developing law of arbitration. The Supreme Court’s 
pro-arbitration decisions continue unabated.118 Nevertheless, California 
courts have doggedly preserved at least some of unconscionability’s viability 
in arbitration cases.119 Knapp has applauded the judicial pushback: 
Our survey of the courts at work in the unconscionability decisions 
reveals to me neither a lawless mob armed with pitchforks and torches, 
storming the castle of federal supremacy, nor a cabal of crafty and 
conniving functionaries, out to subvert established authority. Rather I 
see merely a loose collection of public servants, united only by their 
zeal to preserve, protect, and defend the rights of those who appear 
before them. By invoking the rhetoric of unconscionability, these 
judges are not merely acting tactically in a game of legal chess—
although they may be doing that as well—they are sending a message, 
not just to the U.S. Supreme Court, but to the other officials and 
institutions that collectively make up our legal system.120 
Even if unconscionability ultimately fails to survive as a consumer defense 
in arbitration cases, some believe that the lower court decisions herald a 
new era for a reinvigorated unconscionability doctrine generally. Knapp, 
reviewing unconscionability cases outside of arbitration, optimistically 
reported “a possibly wider and more significant role for the concept of 
unconscionability as the new century unfolds.”121 Stempel drew a similarly 
optimistic conclusion from the arbitration cases: 
 
Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey, supra note 1, at 317 (citations omitted). 
 117. Stempel, supra note 6, at 802. 
 118. See, e.g., Amer. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310 (2013) (holding that 
arbitration provision waiving class actions was not invalid under a judicially created “effective 
vindication” doctrine); AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2010) (holding that 
FAA preempts California’s judicial rule regarding the unconscionability of class arbitration waivers in 
consumer contract). 
 119. See Cynthia Galvez, Fancy Footwork: California Narrowly Applies U.S. Supreme Court FAA 
Precedent; Upholds State Law Unconscionability as a Ground for Refusing to Enforce Arbitration Agreement, 
Alternatives to High Cost Litig. (Int’l Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, New York, N.Y.), 
Jan. 2014, at 10 (reporting on Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 311 P.3d 184 (Cal. 2013), in which the 
California Supreme Court allowed a narrowly crafted unconscionability defense against compelled 
arbitration in the employment context to proceed). 
 120. Knapp, Blowing the Whistle, supra note 1, at 628. 
 121. Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey, supra note 1, at 326 (reviewing cases in sales and leases, 
service contracts, domestic relations, real estate, and consumer credit and lending). 
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[T]he answer of many courts to the new twenty-first century problem 
of arbitrability has been the rediscovery and reinvigoration of a venerable 
doctrine that deserves greater respect and more frequent use across the 
board. . . . The arbitration-unconscionability experience suggests that a 
relatively less constrained version of the unconscionability norm should 
continue to play a role in contract construction, for both arbitration 
terms and other contract provisions.122 
The stronger form of unconscionability revealed in the arbitration cases 
suggests that unconscionability can serve as a useful judicial policing 
mechanism in the consumer context.123 
B. Fine-Tuning Unconscionability 
This Subpart discusses suggestions that would give unconscionability 
a more meaningful policing role in the sphere of consumer contracts. 
While some proposals to strengthen unconscionability have urged radical 
overhaul, others involve only judicial “fine-tuning” of unconscionability 
in ways that do not do violence to the U.C.C.’s or Restatement’s 
construction of unconscionability. The suggestions considered here share 
the dual objectives of being more useful in individual cases and deterring 
unconscionability in future contracts. Moreover, most of these suggestions 
offer ways to reconceive the unconscionability doctrine that are within 
the grasp of judges. 
1. Expanding Remedies 
A number of scholars have argued that unconscionability should 
have an affirmative application, and not be viewed as merely defensive. 
Their suggestions widely range from recognizing unconscionability as a 
tort to simply recognizing it as a basis in contract to affirmatively seek 
restitution. 
The boldest suggestion to reinvigorate unconscionability is to 
establish a parallel tort-based claim.124 Proponents of unconscionability as 
a tort regard tort-based compensatory and punitive damages as more apt 
given the nature of unconscionability.125 Furthermore, proponents of 
recognizing a tort of unconscionability assert that it is appropriate to 
impose tort remedies in order to influence public policy and promote 
 
 122. Stempel, supra note 6, at 860. 
 123. See Smith, supra note 52, at 1110–11 (calling for judicially revised constructions of the 
objective theory of assent and the duty to read rule in the analysis of adhesionary contracts). 
 124. Establishing new torts is within the domain of the common law. See Donald B. King, The Tort 
of Unconscionability: A New Tort for New Times, 23 St. Louis U. L.J. 97, 97 (1979). 
 125. See Paul Bennett Marrow, Crafting a Remedy for the Naughtiness of Procedural Unconscionability, 
34 Cumb. L. Rev. 11, 14 (2003) (urging recognition of a new tort focused on procedural unconscionability); 
King, supra note 124, at 113 (arguing that unconscionability represents a legal wrong that courts should 
recognize in tort); Gaddy Wells, Note, The Doctrine of Unconscionability: A Sword As Well As a Shield, 
29 Baylor L. Rev. 309, 313 (1977) (recognizing a new tort). 
O - Beh_17 (EGK) (1) (Do Not Delete) 5/21/2015 12:07 AM 
May 2015]          CURING THE INFIRMITIES 1035 
“consumer justice.”126 They perceive the wrongfulness of unconscionable 
behavior as a larger social harm that extends beyond the two parties to 
the contract. In the view of one scholar, procedural unconscionability in 
particular should be treated as a tort because it threatens our collective 
buy-in to principles of contract generally: “Unconscionable contract 
formation is an affront to the logic of a legal system that assumes 
rationality in the contract-formation process and potentially undermines 
our system of contract enforcement as a whole.”127 A desire to prevent 
these wider harms to the foundation of contract law therefore justifies 
unconscionability as a tort: 
A remedy at law is needed, in addition to the equitable remedies 
currently available, to deter the repeat offender and to preserve the 
sanctity of the contracting process. . . . 
  . . . Treating procedural unconscionability as potentially actionable 
[in tort] recognizes that overreaching can sometimes do more than 
disturb the balance of the relationship between the parties. A legal 
cause of action for procedural unconscionability would recognize that 
overreaching can inflict actual damage on the victim and on society’s 
interest in the contracting process.128 
Unconscionability as tort heightens attention on the social harm that 
unconscionable contractors cause beyond the damage inflicted upon the 
other party. 
Stopping short of tort-like conceptualizations, others have urged that 
courts should recognize an affirmative, as well as defensive, posture for 
unconscionability claims, thus providing litigants with a wider range of 
contract remedies. Prince pointed out that the “artificial” distinction 
courts make between a defensive and offensive use of unconscionability 
illogically fails to compensate for losses caused by the fulfillment of an 
unconscionable contract.129 Prince’s position has been adopted by a few 
 
 126. See King, supra note 124, at 124–25. 
 127. Marrow, supra note 125, at 15. Paul Bennett Marrow explained: 
Unconscionable conduct in the negotiation process should be deterred. Current statutory 
attempts to curb unconscionable activity fall short of providing the deterrence that is needed. 
Remedies at law, not equity, accomplish deterrence. The tort that this article proposes, 
Consequential Procedural Unconscionability, provides an instrument for deterrence. Without 
this tort, the tortfeasor has no reason to refrain from exploiting the benefits available 
through the use of procedurally unconscionable strategies and tactics. 
Id. In a subsequent article, Marrow argued that unconscionability in the consumer context should be 
focused solely on the impact the contracting behavior has on public policy implications beyond the 
contracting parties. See Paul Bennett Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of 
Unconscionability, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 187, 189 (2005). 
 128. Marrow, supra note 125, at 16. White and Summers also explored the desirability of awarding 
punitive damages for the sake of deterrence when a pattern of unconscionability exists. They concluded, 
“At least one of us is hesitant to turn loose the punitive damage dogs. After all, this is a commercial, not a 
consumer, code.” White & Summers, supra note 57, § 5–8, at 239.  
 129. Prince, supra note 59, at 548. Prince wrote: 
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courts that allow affirmative and offensive uses of unconscionability 
under the existing doctrine.130 At the very least, equitable remedies 
including restitution are warranted.131 
Expanding remedies by allowing prevailing defendants to recover 
attorney’s fees also has appeal because it serves multiple desirable 
goals.132 Granting courts discretion to award attorney’s fees to victims of 
unconscionability who successfully defend a lawsuit acknowledges: 
(1) the injury victim suffered in defending and vindicating her rights 
against a wrongdoer; (2) the benefits bestowed on nonparties as a result 
of having a court declare a contractual term in a standard contract 
unconscionable; and (3) the deterrence effects an award might have on 
future unconscionable contracting. Attorney’s fees are already common 
in many consumer protection statutes, where unconscionable contracting 
is often regulated for precisely these reasons.133 However, absent a statute 
authorizing an award of fees, judicial adherence to the American Rule 
makes it unlikely a court will award attorney’s fees in a contractual 
unconscionability case.134 
Stephen Friedman complained that the lesser nonenforcement 
remedy is inadequate because it fails to adequately capture actual losses 
suffered by defendants as a result of unconscionability and because the 
want of remedies creates perverse incentives for repeat actors. Friedman 
justified departure from the American Rule135 because a finding of 
 
An affirmative recovery should be allowed, however, in at least two situations: when the 
operation of the unconscionable clause has already caused a loss to the offended party at 
the time of trial and justifies restitution and when striking an unconscionable provision gives 
the party an avenue for recovery based on the remainder of the contract. 
Id. 
 130. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2010); 
Eva v. Midwest Nat’l Mortg. Banc, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 862, 895–96 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
 131. See White & Summers, supra note 57, § 5–8, at 237–38. 
 132. Stephen E. Friedman, Giving Unconscionability More Muscle: Attorney’s Fees as a Remedy for 
Contractual Overreaching, 44 Ga. L. Rev. 317, 319 (2010). 
 133. For example, state statutes addressing unfair and deceptive trade practices typically, but not 
always, allow for recovery of attorney’s fees. See Carolyn L. Carter, Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., 
Consumer Protection in the States: A 50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and 
Practices Statutes (Feb. 2009), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf. 
 134. Under the so-called English Rule, a prevailing party is awarded attorney’s fees, while under 
the American Rule, fee shifting is not the norm. See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on 
Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1567 (1993) (tracing the 
history of both rules). The American Rule has well-established exceptions. If a contract provides for attorney 
fees, it will be enforced. Id. at 1578. Other well-established exceptions include the common fund exception 
and the substantial benefit doctrines, which focus on the benefits the litigation has bestowed on nonlitigants; 
and the contempt and bad faith exceptions, which each focus on the conduct of the losing party in the course 
of the litigation. Id. at 1579–87. Statutory exceptions to the American Rule abound: “The major purpose of 
state fee-shifting legislation is to compensate the prevailing plaintiff, promote public interest litigation, 
punish or deter the losing party for misconduct, or prevent abuse of the judicial system.” Id. at 1588. 
 135. Historical and comparative accounts of the so-called American Rule and English Rule suggest 
that numerous judicial and statutory exceptions blur the distinctions in large part. See id. at 1570–90; 
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unconscionability reveals “that the overreaching party has abused a 
privileged position” and that awarding attorney’s fees to the victim of 
unconscionability “would . . . respect unconscionability’s particular 
nature and heritage.”136 Friedman argued that litigation involving 
standardized contracting justifies an attorney’s fees award because the 
award accurately captures the real damage inflicted upon the victim of 
the unconscionable contract. He explained that challenging provisions 
within standardized forms come with unique litigation burdens and 
constitute a tort-like wrong against consumers.137 He noted that allowing 
courts discretion to award attorney’s fees to consumers has an added 
benefit as a sanction “sufficient to focus the attention of sellers and their 
lawyers” on the fairness of standardized forms so as to avoid 
unconscionability.138 Friedman therefore proposed that a few bold state 
legislatures might stimulate other states to amend their versions of U.C.C. 
section 2-302 to expressly provide for such an award.139 
Others scholars have proposed altering the burdens of proof required 
to establish unconscionability, particularly in the standard consumer 
contract context. As an affirmative defense, courts typically place the 
burden to plead and prove unconscionability on the defendant.140 Yet, 
many scholars have observed that standard form contracts, although 
extraordinarily common, defy contract law’s fundamental assumption 
that contracts are based on mutual bargaining and assent. This 
assumption justifies the powerful freedom of contract principles that 
make unconscionability difficult to prove.141 Some scholars suggest that a 
more principled approach to unconscionability in standard form contracting 
 
John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 9, 27–31 (1984). Alaska has rejected the American Rule in favor of “a variation of 
the ‘English Rule.’” See Douglas C. Rennie, Rule 82 & Tort Reform: An Empirical Study of the Impact 
of Alaska’s English Rule on Federal Civil Case Filings, 29 Alaska L. Rev. 1, 1–2 (2012). 
 136. Friedman, supra note 132, at 319. 
 137. Friedman explained that consumers who establish unconscionability expended attorney fees 
directly and discretely caused by the unconscionability. He likened the unconscionable provision to a 
breach of warranty and the expense to establish unconscionability as a direct damage. Id. at 361–63. He 
characterized unconscionability as “wrong against that consumer,” for which a direct remedy is 
warranted. Id. at 363. 
 138. Id. at 365–66. 
 139. Id. at 371 (“All that is necessary is for a few state legislatures to authorize attorney’s fees to 
get the ball rolling.”). Arizona and Hawaii allow the prevailing party in contract actions to recover 
attorney’s fees. Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-341.01 (LexisNexis 2014) (“In any contested action arising out of 
a contract, express or implied, the court may award the successful party reasonable attorney fees.”); 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 607-14 (2014) (“In all the courts, in all actions in the nature of assumpsit and in all 
actions on a promissory note or other contract in writing that provides for an attorney’s fee, there shall 
be taxed as attorney’s fees, to be paid by the losing party . . . .”). 
 140. See, e.g., Southworth & McGill, P.A., v. S. Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 580 So. 2d 628, 630–31 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (citing cases for proposition that unconscionability is an affirmative defense that 
must be pleaded and proved). 
 141. See generally 1 Farnsworth, supra note 57, at 556–72 (discussing the judicial difficulties in 
utilizing traditional contract doctrines to respond to the issues raised by standardized contract). 
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would place a burden on a dominant party to defend boilerplate provisions 
when attacked as unconscionable. 
Refining the burdens of proof and production within the existing 
doctrine of unconscionability recognizes that standard boilerplate terms 
are not the product of traditional bargaining and equality.142 In the context 
of adhesionary standardized contracts, Russell Korobkin observed that 
market pressure will not produce efficiency as to nonsalient terms.143 
Efficient terms are beneficial, however. Korobkin explained that sellers 
have an incentive to insert nonsalient terms in form contracts that are not 
efficient, but that instead favor themselves over the buyers.144 James Gibson, 
building on Korobkin’s contributions, suggested the following refinement 
to courts’ methodology for finding unconscionability: 
First, as always, the consumer must prove procedural unconscionability 
by showing that the disputed term was not salient—but this inquiry 
should take into account emerging empirical evidence and the full 
context of the overall transaction. Second, if the consumer satisfies this 
burden, then the burden on the issue of substantive unconscionability 
shifts to the seller, who must show that the term was efficient. Failure 
to do so means the term is unenforceable.145 
Notably, neither the Restatement nor the U.C.C. assigns any particular 
evidentiary burdens to either party, instead placing an equal responsibility 
on each party to make its case. The U.C.C. provides merely that “[w]hen 
it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause 
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence . . . to aid the court in making the 
determination.”146 The Restatement leaves the court squarely in charge 
of how evidence about unconscionability should emerge, speaking only 
 
 142. Russell Korobkin, although favoring a “market and government institutions” approach to designing 
the nonsalient, boilerplate terms, has suggested that to the extent unconscionability remains the domain of 
judges, the inquiry and burdens of establishing unconscionability should be refined to promote efficiency 
principles. He proposed that courts analyze unconscionability in the standard form contract area as follows: 
(1) “procedural unconscionability” analysis should be motivated by an inquiry into a term’s 
salience, (2) “substantive unconscionability” determinations should depend on whether 
terms are more costly to buyers than they are beneficial to sellers ex ante, (3) courts should 
require buyers to meet an exacting burden of proof before finding a term unconscionable 
under this criterion, and (4) courts should liberally refuse to enforce terms found 
unconscionable under this standard, and even refuse to enforce entire contracts on some 
occasions, in order to provide an incentive to sellers to draft efficient form contract terms ex 
ante when the market fails to provide such an incentive. 
Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 1203, 1208 (2003). 
 143. Korobkin explained that these are the terms within standard contracts that do not capture a buyer’s 
limited attention or concern because they are regarded as of low probability or significance to the 
transaction. Id. at 1234–36. 
 144. Id. at 1243–44. 
 145. James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 161, 223–24 (2013). 
 146. U.C.C. § 2-302(2) (2002). 
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of the court’s prerogative to “refuse” enforcement in some form or 
another.147 Thus, the unconscionability doctrine grants a court the authority 
to construct a framework to consider unconscionability in the context of 
the case before it. Because adhesionary contracts challenge common 
notions of contractual assent, courts might justifiably demand that the 
drafter of a problematic standardized term first show that it was a 
commercially reasonable term.148 
2. A Judicial Attitudinal Adjustment 
Others scholars have boldly called for a judicial attitudinal 
adjustment toward the unconscionability doctrine. This attitude 
adjustment derives from an acknowledgment that unconscionability is 
not a rigid rule-based doctrine but a standards-based doctrine vested in 
the discretion of the court. Rather than evoking fear of unconscionability 
as a rule devoid of principle, judges should embrace unconscionability’s 
flexibility as a necessary counterweight to mindless formalism and rigidity.149 
Unconscionability is a judicial means to drill deep into the soul of a contract 
and test its realness rather than its form. 
An early voice in unconscionability scholarship, M.P. Ellinghaus, 
responded to Leff’s critique of unconscionability’s vagaries in In Defense of 
Unconscionability, where he celebrated unconscionability’s “wooliness.”150 
Ellinghaus characterized Leff and other critics as mistaken with respect to 
unconscionability’s fundamental function in contract law. In his view, 
Leff’s problem was that he was characterizing unconscionability as a 
meaningless and unprincipled rule, when in fact, unconscionability 
existed as one of contract law’s “residual categories,” occupying that 
stage with doctrines of necessary vagueness such as “‘reasonableness,’ ‘due 
care,’ and ‘good faith.’”151 Ellinghaus argued that unconscionability was 
not a rule that was “abstract” to the point of “meaninglessness” as critics 
complained, but instead was not a rule at all.152 Rather, it was a 
“standard” that was “essential to the well-being” of contract law itself.153 
He placed his faith in courts to employ unconscionability prudently. To 
Leff, he responded: “Most important of all, such an overemphasis [on 
definitional failure] is calculated to discourage the courts from discharging 
the function of reasoned and creative exegesis and implementation which 
Section 2-302 so obviously (because necessarily) entrusts to them.”154 
 
 147. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981). 
 148. See Smith, supra note 52, at 1110–11. 
 149. See Stempel, supra note 6, at 859. 
 150. M. P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 Yale L.J. 757, 795 (1969). 
 151. Id. at 759. 
 152. Id. at 757. 
 153. Id. at 757, 759. 
 154. Id. at 761. 
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Ellinghuas placed extraordinary confidence in the common law to recognize 
an evolving standard: “[U]nconscionability is a ‘standard’ which awaits, 
and is designed to encourage, organic development by the courts.”155 He 
concluded, “[W]e cannot do without such regrettably vague standards.”156 
Amy Schmitz, like Ellinghaus some forty years before, also defended 
unconscionability as encapsulating a norm that succeeds precisely because 
of its flexibility. She argued that unconscionability defies rigid formalism 
in order to ensure contract law remains true to “core human values.”157 In 
defense of unconscionability, she writes: 
Unconscionability should retain its flexibility and generality due to its 
philosophical and historical underpinnings. Fairness standards underlying 
unconscionability flow from natural and generalized norms of civil 
behavior deemed necessary to societal survival. These behavioral norms, 
therefore, should drive unconscionability’s flexible application despite a 
modern resurgence of classical rigidity and resistance to fairness review.158 
She urged judges to further unleash the doctrine and “resist formalist 
trends and use unconscionability as a safety net to catch cases of contractual 
unfairness that slip through more formulaic contract defenses.”159 
One way to implement this attitudinal adjustment is to recognize 
that unconscionability shares the objectives of illegality in contract law 
and judges possess a similar guardian function. These adjustments 
require only a willing judge. The language of the Restatement and the 
U.C.C. already entrusts unconscionability to the judge in the first 
instance, along the lines of illegality. U.C.C. Section 2-302(1) begins not 
with a requirement that a party raise unconscionability, but with the 
judge finding it: “If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any 
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was 
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract.”160 Section 2-302(2) 
provides further support to the assertion that the oversight of 
unconscionability is a judicial responsibility. “When it is claimed or 
appears to the court that the contract or any clause thereof may be 
unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to 
 
 155. Id. at 795. 
 156. Id. at 815. 
 157. Schmitz, supra note 3, at 73. Schmitz explains that the doctrine’s flexibility enables judges to 
test the core principle of consent to contract, which formulaic rules of formation might otherwise miss: 
Common law unconscionability, thus, has evolved in the shadows of a rigid rule of law that 
emphasized clear contract enforcement. This flexible doctrine has survived despite 
dominance of formalism and dogma denouncing inquiry into the fairness of exchange. It 
also has remained flexible in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), despite proposals for 
its containment. Indeed, it continues to allow courts to grant relief from contracts that 
appear consensual but are not in fact the products of real choice. 
Id. at 84. 
 158. Id. at 102. 
 159. Id. 
 160. U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (2012). 
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present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid 
the court in making the determination.”161 Thus, if unconscionability 
appears to the court, it may raise the issue, and then the litigants have the 
supporting role of aiding the court in its decision. As a doctrine steeped 
in public policy and intended as a judicial tool to root out the evil results 
of naughty bargaining, unconscionability naturally seems a close relative 
to illegality. As a result, judges should view raising unconscionability as a 
judicial responsibility, rather than limiting it to an affirmative defense 
that must be raised by a party. Judges can and should raise it sua sponte, 
lest the judiciary become complicit in allowing unconscionable results. 
Judges might also draw other lessons from illegality and, when 
appropriate, fashion a remedy that sanctions dominant actors to deter 
unconscionable contracting. As Korobkin explained, once courts determine 
that a seller imposed an unconscionable term, mere “reformation 
remedy . . . provides no incentive for sellers to resist the market pressure 
to provide low-quality non-salient form terms even when low-quality 
terms are inefficient.”162 Since “[m]ost buyers will abide by the form term 
rather than challenge it, giving the seller a windfall,”163  
[i]n the unusual case that the term is challenged and found 
unconscionable by a court, the seller is no worse off than it would have 
been if it had provided an efficient term initially. . . . [U]nconscionable 
terms will be avoided only when courts intercede in private contracting 
arrangements and invalidate terms. . . .  
. . .  
  The severability doctrine does not require deference to parties who 
knowingly include illegal terms in their contracts, however. As one 
court has observed, to do so would only encourage overreaching by 
drafting parties. This reasoning applies with even greater force to 
unconscionability, because courts are much more poorly suited to 
determine whether or not a term is efficient than they are to determine 
whether a term is illegal. In light of this, and especially if deference is 
given to seller-drafted terms that are not clearly inefficient, it is important 
for courts to provide sellers with the maximum incentive not only to 
attempt to draft efficient non-salient form terms, but also to invest time 
and resources in doing so. 
  Providing such an incentive requires courts, on a finding of 
unconscionability, to severely limit enforcement of the contract in 
question to deter other sellers from similar bad faith or carelessness. 
Put in different terms, courts should recognize a right of buyers to be 
free of unconscionable contracting behavior, and this right should be 
protected with a “property rule” rather than a “liability rule.”164 
 
 161. Id. § 2-302(2) (emphasis added). 
 162. Korobkin, supra note 142, at 1286. 
 163. Id. at 1286. 
 164. Id. at 1286–89. 
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Courts may not be able to legislate unconscionability into oblivion, but at 
the least, they can exercise their discretion to promote conscionable 
contracting in the marketplace. 
3. The Conscience of a Lawyer 
As contracts teachers, we prepare students to know and embrace the 
normative conventions of contract law in practice. Even if one concedes 
that contract law’s unconscionability doctrine has little heft and adds 
little to contract litigation, it would still deserve its enduring place in 
first-year contracts because it forces students to think about bargaining 
disparity and fairness. Unconscionability allows students, who one day will 
represent the powerful, to consider their ethical and moral responsibility 
to weaker parties. Yet, after the first-year class, in the real world of 
lawyering, unconscionability currently misses its hortatory potential as well. 
Transactional practitioners will find little in the Model Rules of 
Professional Responsibility to guide them as they navigate issues of 
fairness and power. Christina Kunz called the current Model Rules 
“thin” in their guidance to transactional lawyers who are considering 
limits of using a client’s power to exact favorable terms from weaker or 
unsophisticated parties.  
[She] invites practicing lawyers, judges, and ethics scholars to look 
more closely at transactional ethics, in order to (1) enhance the legal 
profession’s awareness of ethical pitfalls in “too-sharp” drafting 
practices, (2) bring ethics rules to bear on existing drafting practices 
that violate the rules, and (3) further develop transactional ethics into a 
more robust field that is better able to curb the ethical abuses in 
drafting and negotiation.165 
At the very least, lawyers asked to draft unconscionable or possibly 
unconscionable terms owe duties of wise counsel to their clients.166 Some 
scholars observe that client counseling must go beyond simplistically 
informing clients that they can likely “get away with it.” They urge that 
counseling about unconscionability be “textured,” in order to provide 
clients with a fuller understanding of the possible negative ramifications 
of expedient overreaching on them and on justice more generally.167 Going 
one step further than client counseling, some scholars have called for 
strengthening the disclosure obligations that lawyers have to the other 
party, at least as to the inclusion of unquestionably unconscionable terms.168 
Some who wrestle with the ethical issues related to the imbalance of 
power in transactional practice urge lawyers to develop a more complex 
ethical dimension to their own professional identity that transcends their 
 
 165. Kunz, supra note 73, at 511. 
 166. Id. at 502–04. 
 167. Carrington, supra note 4, at 372; Kunz, supra note 73, 502–04; Schmitz, supra note 70, at 875–76. 
 168. Duhl, supra note 4, at 1012 (calling for conspicuous disclosure of invalid provisions). 
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representation of one client in one transaction. For example, Schmitz, 
critiquing arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, encourages lawyers 
to consider power imbalance as part of their ethical responsibilities: 
Attorneys representing companies in drafting or enforcing consumer 
arbitration clauses should therefore remain committed to justice and 
ethical considerations that transcend stark professional conduct rules. 
This means that they should go beyond rote assumptions of 
arbitration’s benefits to consider the real risks and impacts of onerous 
arbitration provisions. It also means that they should refuse to draft 
provisions that, upon reflection, appear likely to conceal companies’ 
illegal conduct or squelch consumers’ procedural and substantive 
rights.169 
She explains that this “fairness of means and objectives” should be part 
of the transactional lawyer’s professional responsibility because, unlike 
litigation, there is no third-party referee to curb contracting abuses.170 
Deborah Rhode, an outspoken critic of current ethical training of 
lawyers, labeled our current approach as teaching “legal ethics without 
the ethics.”171 The narrow focus law schools place on the rules concerning 
lawyer discipline “leave future practitioners without the foundations for 
reflective judgment.”172 Indeed, the current Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility have been criticized as fixating on the floor of minimum 
rule compliance and ignoring “the broadly moral altogether.”173 Defining 
professionalism only as conformance to the Model Rules of Professional 
Responsibility lowers ethical conduct to the minimum expectations of 
conduct to avoid discipline rather than embracing professionalism as 
embodiment of a richly complex and nuanced professional identity. 
The Carnegie Foundation’s heralded study, Educating Lawyers, 
articulated legal education’s responsibility to invest in cultivating in 
student character, integrity, and a broader view of ethics than mere rule 
compliance.174 Educating Lawyers called on law schools to go beyond 
merely “the law of lawyering” and to allow students to consider “the 
substantive ends of law, the identity and role of lawyers, and questions of 
equity and purpose” and to explore “questions of both competence and 
responsibility to the client and to the legal system.”175 Therefore, even if 
unconscionability proved itself only a withered, atrophied appendage of 
contract law, it still deserves its place in first-year contracts. 
Unconscionability has proven itself a useful springboard in a first-year 
 
 169. Schmitz, supra note 70, at 877. 
 170. Id. at 850. 
 171. Deborah L. Rhode, If Integrity is the Answer, What is the Question?, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 333, 
340 (2003). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, The Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a 
Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 411, 421 (2005). 
 174. William M. Sullivan et al., Educating Lawyers 145–61 (2007). 
 175. Id. at 147. 
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contracts class for discussing that rich sense of integrity and professional 
identity teachers aim to cultivate. 
Conclusion 
“‘[U]nconscionability’ is a residual category of shifting content and 
expansible nature.”176 Rather than shrink from its flexible nature, its 
champions, Knapp among them, have urged judges to accept and use the 
latitude it provides them wisely, to promote fairness and justice in 
contracting.177 This Article explores suggestions advanced by several 
contract scholars to judicially fine-tune the unconscionability doctrine in 
order to enable the doctrine to fulfill its purpose. Most of these are 
within the grasp of a common law judge. For example, to make 
unconscionability more vital and robust, more courts might follow those 
few courts that entertain unconscionability as an affirmative claim that 
can be brought by a victim, as well as an affirmative defense. At the very 
least, in appropriate cases, courts should consider a broader range of 
equitable remedies in addition to nonenforcement, and particularly allow 
declaratory relief and restitution. Expanding the range of remedies 
afforded to victims recognizes that unconscionability can cause financial 
harm that cannot be adequately compensated by mere nonenforcement. 
The exposure to an award of damages, even simple restitution or 
attorney’s fees, may be needed when the unconscionable term has caused 
the victim to incur loss. Moreover, the threat of real damages may also 
deter unconscionable actors. 
Next, courts should acknowledge that unconscionability is close kin 
to illegality. Like other forms of illegality, unconscionable contracts, 
particularly adhesionary form contracts, have negative impacts beyond 
the parties. Pervasive unconscionability undermines basic principles of 
contract law and threatens social order. Therefore, courts should fashion 
remedies in order to deter future unconscionability. And courts should 
accept that the U.C.C. and the Restatement expressly empower a court 
to raise unconscionability sua sponte, precisely so that the court does not 
become an instrument of unconscionability. 
The legal profession might well consider how to dissuade lawyers 
from participating in unconscionable contracting. Unconscionability 
doctrine is intended to identify and remedy bargaining abuse that results 
in grossly unfair contracts, and it does not serve the reputation of the 
legal profession to allow lawyers to be an instrument of unconscionability. 
 
 176. Ellinghaus, supra note 150, at 814. 
 177. Knapp, Twenty-First-Century Survey, supra note 1, at 338 (calling unconscionability “a means of 
tempering economic efficiency with social justice, and moral decency”); Stempel, supra note 6, at 860 
(approving the usefulness of a “a relatively less constrained version of the unconscionability norm”); 
Schmitz, supra note 3, at 117 (urging courts to “resist the pull of contract formalism and rekindle 
unconscionability’s flexibility in order to allow the doctrine to serve its safety net function”). 
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At the very least, when a contract has the stench of unconscionability, 
lawyers owe their own clients wise, cautious, and considered counsel. 
Law schools are charged with helping students to cultivate a worthy 
professional identity rather than teaching them to reside at the ethical 
bottom of the profession. Professional identity is not defined by minimal 
ethical rules, but by a richly nuanced and animated sense of integrity. 
Lawyers of integrity understand the larger responsibilities of their 
profession both to society and to others. 
Most importantly, courts must embrace unconscionability for the 
flexible standard that it was intended to be, and to recognize it as a 
doctrine intended to police and define the essence of bargaining fairness. 
The arbitration cases reveal that unconscionability can be a robust 
common law doctrine that insists upon contracting fairness and justice. 
The unconscionability doctrine should not be perceived as so vague and 
plastic that it endangers contract law; instead, unconscionability should 
be recognized as a standard of essential contracting fairness that has 
been entrusted to the common law of contracts. 
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